During recent years, there has been a rapid growth in deployment of gossip-based protocol in many multicast applications. In a typical gossip-based protocol, each node acts as dual roles of receiver and sender, independently exchanging data with its neighbors to facilitate scalability and resilience. However, most of previous work in this literature seldom considered cheating issue of end users, which is also very important in face of the fact that the mutual cooperation inherently determines overall system performance. In this paper, we investigate the dishonest behaviors in decentralized gossip-based protocol through extensive experimental study. Our original contributions come in two-fold: In the first part of cheating study, we analytically discuss two typical cheating strategies, that is, intentionally increasing subscription requests and untruthfully calculating forwarding probability, and further evaluate their negative impacts. The results indicate that more attention should be paid to defending cheating behaviors in gossip-based protocol. In the second part of anti-cheating study, we propose a receiver-driven measurement mechanism, which evaluates individual forwarding traffic from the perspective of receivers and thus identifies cheating nodes with high incoming/outgoing ratio. Furthermore, we extend our mechanism by introducing reliable factor to further improve its accuracy. The experiments under various conditions show that it performs quite well in case of serious cheating and achieves considerable performance in other cases.
Introduction
The Internet has witnessed the emergence and explosive growth of distributed applications, which enlightened a new area of providing large-scale data multicast [1] . Due to the absence of network infrastructure support for IP multicast [2] , application layer multicast (ALM) [3] - [7] was proposed as the most promising means to provide group communication with the ease of deployment. ALM generally replicates and forwards data in the application level while unicast connections are established between participating nodes.
Gossip-based ALM management protocols gained their popularity in both theoretical research and practical applications in past few years, due to the inherent resilience to high churn of end users [8] - [10] . In a typical gossip-based setting, each node maintains a faction of the whole member group, randomly selects several as its neighbors, and then exchanges control message and data traffic between * Presently, the author is a software engineer in Google office, China.
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peer-pair. Considering that each node, also interchangeably called user or client, could join and leave the multicast group independently and continuously, gossip-based protocols in essence trade robustness in highly dynamic environment with certain degree of redundancy. Therefore, they have been widely deployed in streaming applications [11] - [15] . Our experiences also demonstrate that it could scale to reliably support a great number of users [15] . However, all is not rosy. The anonymous, heterogeneous and distributed nature of gossip-based ALM protocols indicates apparent possibility for selfish end nodes to exploit protocol-specific vulnerabilities and to optimize towards self-interests, undermining the overall system performance. For instance, a node could lie about the actual size of the group to which it sends gossip messages, which in turn results in lower cost for forwarding traffic and maintaining neighborship information. In this case, the system performs worse and even collapses due to poor mutual cooperation. In the literature most of previous research works focused on protocol design and scheduling mechanism, but few considered node cheating behaviors as mentioned to study their impacts upon system performance properties. Therefore, it remains quite important and interesting to attach importance to the research questions such as (1) how nodes in gossip-based protocols cheat, (2) what cheating behaviors will bring to the system, and (3) how to defend various kinds of cheating behaviors as well.
In this paper we investigate corresponding issues in decentralized gossip-based protocol through experimental study. We employ SCAMP (Scalable Membership Protocol, a decentralized, gossip-based protocol) [9] as running example. Our original contributions come in two-fold: In the first part of cheating study, we analytically discuss two typical cheating strategies, that is, intentionally increasing subscription requests and untruthfully calculating forwarding probability, and further evaluate their negative impacts. The results indicate that more attention should be paid to defending cheating behaviors in gossip-based protocol. In the second part of anti-cheating study, we propose a receiverdriven measurement mechanism as case study, which evaluates individual forwarding traffic from the perspective of receivers and thus identifies cheating nodes with high incoming/outgoing traffic ratio. Furthermore, we extend our mechanism by introducing reliable factor to further improve its accuracy. The experiments under various cheating conditions show that it performs quite well in case of serious Copyright c 2008 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers cheating and achieves considerable performance in other cases. As far as we know, no previous works quantitatively discussed cheating behaviors in this area and we claim this is the first step towards building honest gossip-based protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present node cheating strategies in gossip-based protocols in Sect. 2 and make experimental study on the negative impacts of those cheating behaviors. In Sect. 3, We propose the receive-driven anti-cheating mechanism, as well as its improved version, as case study to discuss its performance under various experiment conditions. Section 4 reviews some related research works. Section 5 concludes this paper and gives out future work.
Cheating in Gossip-Based Protocol
In this section, we focus on potential cheating behaviors and their impacts upon system performance. First of all, we abstract the model of a representative decentralized gossipbased ALM protocol for ease of reading, and then discuss various cheating strategies in such a model. Finally, the impacts of node cheating on gossip-based protocol will be analyzed in detail through experimental results.
Representative Model of Gossip-Based Protocol
As mentioned previously, gossip-based protocols generally advocate randomization and redundancy to reliably multicast messages in large-scale dynamic group. They provide probabilistic guarantees of delivery which degrade gracefully in the presence of loss links or fail nodes. With respect to control manner, there are two types of gossip-based protocols: centralized and decentralized. The former involves global knowledge of membership and hence suffers from poor scalability. In the scope of this paper, we mainly consider decentralized gossip-based protocols, in which each node only has a partial and random view of the system. In the following, we employ a simple and fully decentralized gossip-based protocol, SCAMP, as a representative running example to abstract the model of decentralized gossip-based protocols.
As similar in SCAMP, a model with N active nodes requires that each node i should maintain two groups: PartialView O i : the node group to which it sends messages, which is also termed as outgoing or uploading group. InView I i : the node group from which it receives messages, which is also termed as incoming or downloading group.
In the model, new participant i sends subscription request to an arbitrary active member already in the system which is termed as the contact and starts with an initial O i consisting of only this contact. When an existing node j receives a new subscription request, it forwards the identification of new node to all members in its O j . At meanwhile, it also creates c (a system-configured constant)additional copies of received subscription request and then forwards those copies to nodes randomly chosen from its O j . When a node k receives the forwarded subscription, if this is a fresh subscription, it would accept the request and keep the new subscriber in its O k with the probability P k which depends on current size of O k :
If node k doesn't hold the new subscriber, it will continue to forward the subscription to one node uniform-randomly chosen from O k . By this means, those forwarded subscriptions may be held by some nodes or forwarded continuously until a timeout triggers discarding. As proven in [9] , such a model exhibits several desirable properties: on one hand, the probability that a notification reaches everyone exhibits a sharp threshold at log(N); on the other hand, if node i sends a subscription request to a member chosen uniformly from its O i , then the system configure itself towards average PartialView size as:
During messages propagation process, node i sends a message to a random subset of nodes in its O i . When any node receives a message for the first time, it does the same process. Obviously, a larger I i and a smaller O i is what rational nodes desire, motivating them to make use of cheating strategies to exploit others' resources without contribution, which will be discussed as below.
Cheating Strategies and Evaluation Metric
A node in gossip-based protocol may lie about its private information, e.g. the actual size of its O i for purpose of gaining benefits. We refer to those dishonest nodes as "cheaters" in this paper. Intuitively, the major cheating strategies node may adopt are the following two types: Strategy 1: Subscription Cheating (SC). When sending subscription requests for join, cheater i will subscribe more than once, so as to intentionally increase the InView I i for more suppliers. This type of cheating mainly aims to obtain better quality of service.
Strategy 2: Forwarding Cheating (FC).
Similarly, on receiving a subscription request, cheater i untruthfully calculates the probability of becoming the uploading node of others by an exaggerated O i . This type of cheating attempts to achieve less replicating and forwarding burden.
To better understand the impacts of these two cheating behaviors, let us first define some system parameters and evaluation metric before proceeding to the experimental study:
Parameter 1: Subscription Cheating Degree. When a new node sends subscription request to join the group, the ratio of actual requests to the basic value (once), is defined as Subscription Cheating Degree, denoted as s.
Parameter 2: Forwarding Cheating Degree. When receiving a subscription request, the ratio of the bogus value | O i | to the actual value | O i | is defined as Forwarding Cheating Degree, denoted as p.
Parameter 3: System Cheating Degree. In the gossip-based protocol, the percentage of cheaters out of all nodes is defined as System Cheating Degree, denoted as t.
Obviously, we have s ≥ 1, p ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ t ≤ 100%, and various t, s and p will result in different impacts on system performance. Such a gossip-based protocol system with cheaters is denoted as G (N, s, p, t) hereinafter. To highlight the benefits of cheaters, we reasonably treat the InView size | I i | of node i as the metric of service quality it obtains, and the PartialView size | O i | as the metric of the outgoing service it provides. To this end, the whole "welfare" of cheaters is formally defined as:
Metric 1: Cheater Group Benefit Degree. In a G (N, s, p, t) , we define the sum of individual benefit as Cheat Group Benefit Degree, denoted as θ(N, s, p, t), where
This metric indicates that, if θ(N, s, p, t) < 0, the cheaters group does not benefit from the cheating behaviors, but a victim instead. The less θ(N, s, p, t) is, the more damage the cheaters group suffers; If θ(N, s, p, t) > 0, on the contrary, the cheaters group benefits from the cheating behaviors, while a larger θ(N, s, p, t) means higher benefits.
What Cheating Behaviors Bring?
With the model, strategies, system parameters and metric defined above, we conduct extensive simulation experiments to study the impacts of cheating behaviors in gossip-based protocols. The simulation is carried out on Matlab. A Poisson process with strength 10 nodes/sec is employed to simulate the new node arrival. If a node is a cheater, it will send subscription request to multiple existing nodes simultaneously. After joining, the node will maintain in the session until the end of the simulation. We have tested 25 groups of 50,000 nodes, each in a gossip-based session. The results are plotted as the average values of these 25 groups. Each group was tied with a Subscription Cheating Degree s of 5, 10, 15 and 20, a Forwarding Cheating Degree p of 10, 20 and 50, and a System Cheating Degree t from 0% to 100% with 20% interval, respectively.
We depict the distribution of InView and PartialView size of a 50,000-node gossip-based protocol with no cheaters at the beginning of experiments. As shown in Fig. 1 , it achieves an average | I | and | O | at log(50000) ≈ 10.8 if no cheaters exist. Then we discuss what cheating behaviors will bring into the gossip-based protocol in two steps.
In the first set of experiments, we analyze the impacts of SC in terms of various InView and PartialView size. Figures 2(a) and (b) illustrate the InView size I C and PartialView size O C of cheaters with different s and t when Forward Cheating Degree p is fixed. As shown in Fig. 2(a) , with a fixed t, SC leads to increased I C of cheaters owing to more subscription requests and in turn more nodes accepting the requests. However, note that with a fixed s, I C increases when 0 ≤ t ≤ 20%, while exhibits a degrading trend when t > 20%. Obviously, if more and more nodes choose cheating, the probability of cheater counteracts another cheater increases. In this case, most subscription requests cannot be accepted by any nodes, and finally be discarded due to timeout. The red lines in Fig. 2(a) show that when t is fixed, O C grows as s increases. But as t gets higher, O C won't change too much since the p has been fixed in this simulation. Figure 2(b) further illustrates the θ(N, s, p, t) with different s and t. It is clear that by increasing s, cheaters always have positive gains from the cheating behaviors. When t = 20%, cheaters achieve the maximum benefit. In the extreme case, when t = 100%, all the nodes in the system are cheaters and they cannot gain any benefit from each other. 
Remarks:
In a short summary, we conclude that cheaters can benefit from adjusting the Subscription Cheating Degree s, which in turn determines the size of InView. From Figs. 2(a) and (b), we also know that the benefits of cheaters do not show a direct relation with the System Cheating Degree t. When N, s and p are fixed, there is a specific value for t (0 ≤ t ≤ 100%) that maximizes their benefits and this value varies in different system settings.
In the second set of experiments, we study the impacts of FC behaviors from the perspective of honest nodes. The InView size I H and PartialView size O H of honest nodes under different p and t when Subscription Cheating Degree s is fixed, are illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . As shown, when p is fixed, I H increases when 0 ≤ t ≤ 20%, and then decreases as t grows. In this case, cheaters increase their PartialView size to reduce the probability as the providers (p > 1) according to Eq. (1). Therefore, honest nodes are more likely to be providers, resulting in larger PartialView size | O H |. The red lines in Fig. 3(a) show honest nodes' PartialView size O H against parameter p. Observe that when 0 ≤ t < 80%, O H goes up as t increases. When t ≥ 80%, the value decreases, as similar to SC in Fig. 2(a) . Figure 3 (b) depicts corresponding θ (N, s, p, t) when FC exists. Note that cheaters also benefit from forwarding cheating behaviors. With t fixed, the larger p is, the more benefits they gain. It is because as p grows, the probability of cheaters being providers decreases, so a smaller PartialView emerges. We also find out that when t = 20%, cheaters gain maximal benefits, as similar to Fig. 2(b) .
Remarks: In another short summary, as Figs. 3(a) and (b) illustrated, Forwarding Cheating Degree p also has a great negative impact on gossip-based protocol. The larger p is, the more benefits cheaters gain. Therefore, cheaters always have motivation to do so. There is also a specific value for t (0 ≤ t ≤ 100%) that maximizes their benefits.
Efforts on Anti-Cheating

Receiver-Driven Anti-Cheating Mechanism
So far, we have discussed the negative impacts of cheating behaviors in gossip-based protocols. The experimental results indicate that more attention should be paid to defending those behaviors when designing such protocols. In this section, we propose a simple receiver-driven anti-cheating mechanism to identify cheating nodes by accounting the ratio between incoming and outgoing traffic and provide performance evaluation study in next subsection.
Considering that most trust management protocols involve a trust third party to record, aggregate and distribute the information of each node, we also assume such an authority exists for ease of discussion. Note that the third party should not necessarily be a centralized node; instead, it consists of several independent trusted super-nodes, each of which is responsible for a small collection of nodes participated in the gossip session. As a result, each super-node has enough ability to handle the reports from the participating nodes. And in the current experiments, TCP is utilized to transmit reports. Due to TCP's reliability, the nodes from which any report is not received are considered as cheaters; and for those from which the report is received, the following anti-cheating mechanism can further detect cheaters from them. The key idea of this mechanism is to measure the outgoing traffic of node i by the nodes in its O i . Roughly speaking, nodes periodically report the message traffic from incoming group to the trusted third party which hence could retrieve the ratio of incoming traffic to outgoing traffic of each node. For node i, the ratio is so-called i . A cheater, whether choosing subscription cheating (SC) or forwarding cheating (FC), or both, will be identified by a high incoming/outgoing traffic ratio since it mainly exploits others' resources.
The question is hence translated into how to select the appropriate incoming/outgoting ratio to determine the honesty of end nodes, which is quite important and sensitive to the performance of this mechanism. In the experimental study, we adopt a simple guideline, that is, the average ratio in an honest gossip-based protocol to reveal some observations. Without any confusion, we follow previous assumption that the InView size | I i | of node i is considered as the metric of incoming traffic, while the PartialView size | O i | as the metric of the outgoing traffic it provides.
Evaluation Parameters and Metrics
We first define some system parameters and metrics here for sake of presentation.
Parameter 4: Detection Factor. In a gossip-based protocol without cheaters, the average ratio of InView size | I | to PartialView size | O | is defined as Detection Factor, denoted as ε:
If i ≥ ε (see Sect. 3.1 for i 's definition), node i is identified as a cheater; otherwise, it's considered as an honest node. Metric 2: Cheater Detection Degree. In a gossipbased protocol with cheaters, if S C denotes the group of cheaters, S H denotes the group of honest nodes andS denotes the groups of nodes which are identified as cheaters by the mechanism, then we evaluate the performance of this anti-cheating mechanism through Cheater Detection Degree, which consists of: Precision: the ratio of the number of actual cheaters inS to the number of nodes inS , which represents the effectiveness of the mechanism. That is,
Note that the fault detection ratio is equal to 1 − Pr. Recall: the ratio of the number of actual cheaters inS to the total number of cheaters in the protocol, which represents the coverage of the mechanism. That is,
Note that the miss detection ratio is equal to 1 − Re.
Experimental Study
In the experimental study, we adopt the same setup as previous section. In total there were 25 groups of 50,000 nodes, each in a gossip-based session and the results are averaged through these 25 groups. According to Fig. 1 , the Detection Factor in an honest gossip-based protocol is about ε(50000) ≈ 1.18, denoted as basic hereinafter.
In the first set of experiments, we examine the performance of the receiver-driven mechanism in case of SC and FC, that is, s = 1, p = 10 and s = 10, p = 10 respectively. The system cheating degree t varies from 20% to 100%. Figure 4 (a) depicts the Cheater Detection Degree when s = 1, p = 10 with various t values. As shown, as t increases, the Pr of receiver-driven mechanism rises. Obviously, a larger t means more cheaters being identified in theS , which in turn results in a higher precision. Note that the Re exhibits decreasing trend with cheaters increasing. In previous section, cheaters achieve maximum Cheat Group Benefit Degree θ when t = 20%. As t increases continuously, the average ratio of InView size to PartialView size decrease gradually, closing to . This causes more and more cheaters could not be detected solely by the , resulting in lower recall. We conclude here that if only SC exists, pure incoming/outgoing ratio by receiver-driven mechanism could not achieve outstanding performance. Figure 4 (b) shows the Cheater Detection Degree when s = 10, p = 10. Observe that the mechanism achieves better precision as compared to that in Fig. 4(a) . Even when t = 20%, the precision has reached as high as 97% and gets close to 100% when t = 40%. At the meanwhile, the recall in this case also outperforms that in Fig. 4(a) . When t = 20%, the recall is quite close to 100%, which means nearly all the cheaters are identified. As t increases, the recall also show a similar degrading trend, but in a more gentle way.
Remarks: The receiver-driven mechanism performs quite well if both SC and FC exist. As shown in Fig. 4(b) , the precision and recall exhibit quite comfortable results when 20% nodes cheat.
In the second set of experiments, we further discuss the detection performance in case of various values of Detection Factor ε. Figure 5(a) shows the Cheater Detection Degree when we deploy 0.8 as the criteria to identify cheaters when s = 1, p = 10. As compared to Fig. 4(a) , a lower Detection Factor, say 0.8 , leads to higher recall and worse precision. It is because that intrinsic to 0.8 is to release the definition to cheaters and thus the precision is in the downturn. Remarks: A larger Detection Factor improves the precision with cost of recall. How to reasonably leverage the tradeoff between precision and recall is important to detect cheaters and will be studied in the next subsection.
On Improving the Anti-Cheating Mechanism
Since it's demonstrated in the above sections that a larger Detection Factor improves the precision with cost of recall, we attempt to improve the anti-cheating mechanism by setting Detection Factor to a relatively large value, that is, ε = a , where a > 1, to keep high precision and compensating the recall in additional method, which works as follows:
Besides reporting the InView to the trusted third party, each node is also required to periodically report its PartialView to the third party, which thus can retrieve confliction between these two kinds of reports. If node i claims that node j is in its PartialView, but j's InView report doesn't contain i, there's a confliction between the two nodes' reports. Assume that node i's reported PartialView size is n i , among which there are x i nodes denying they're in i's PartialView. Thus, we define reliable factor of node i (or RF i ) as:
The smaller the RF i , the more reliable node i is; vice versa. To the extreme, when x i = 0, i.e. node i's report on its PartialView doesn't conflict with any other's, it has the highest reliability with RF i having the smallest value 1; when x i = n i , i.e. its report on PartialView is denied by all the corresponding nodes, it has the lowest reliability with RF i having the largest value a.
To this end, we can identify node i by comparing the value of i * RF i with the Detecting Factor a . For sake of presentation, we define:
We then identify the cheaters as follows: when i < , η i < 1 always holds, and hence node i is identified as an honest node; when i ≥ a , η i ≥ 1 always holds, thus node i is identified as a cheater; when ≤ i < a , the value of RF i will influence the result, that is, if node i has a high reliability (i.e. x i < n i (1 − log a i )), it will be identified as an honest node, otherwise, it will be judged as a cheater. We depict the relation between the identification result and the i in Fig. 6 .
With the same setup as previous sections, we take experiments on the extended anti-cheating mechanism in which a is set to 1.5. Figure 7 illustrates the results of Cheater Detection Degree. We can see that with the extended mechanism, both the detection precision and the coverage could be in a high level.
Remarks:
The extended anti-cheating mechanism could enlarge the value of R e because more cheaters could be detected by means of Reliable Factor. At the meanwhile, it's also capable of maintain a high P r because Reliable Factor, which has a positive correlation with the i , also reflects whether a node is honest, thus seldom identifies an honest node as a cheater by mistake.
Related Work
Traditional ALM can be commonly classified into three categories in terms of the tree building approach: tree-first [3] , [4] , mesh-first [5] , implicit protocol [6] . It also involves single tree protocol [6] and multiple tree protocol [7] according to the number of trees built. The impact of node cheating on those tree-based ALM protocols has been well studied. Authors in [16] discussed the impacts of cheating nodes in four representative tree-based ALM protocols and mainly focused on selfish nodes acting independently, cheating about their distance vectors when constructing the tree. They indicate that simple cheating strategies always have negative impact, either on the performance of the tree as perceived by its nodes (both cheats and honest nodes), or on the underlying physical network, or both. Besides, cheating behaviors also had negative effects on the stability of ALM tree [17] , owing to much additional overhead for ALM to reconstruct the multicast tree, as well as more burdens to honest receivers, especially the source node. In terms of anti-cheating study, existing research either discussed cheat-proof protocols in online gaming [18] or provided incentive for mobile nodes to report actions honestly [19] . However, as we discussed in Sect. 1, the anti-cheating issue in gossip-based ALM protocols is with little attention. Since the cheating behavior is protocol-dependent, it's worth for us systematically investigating the cheating behavior in gossip-based protocol and proposing effective anti-cheating mechanism.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we study the impacts of node cheating upon the well deployed gossip-based protocols and anticheating mechanism with its performance through experimental study. The first part of cheating study demonstrates that nodes could exploits simple cheating strategies to benefit self-interests. The negative impacts further motivate us to propose a receiver-driven measurement mechanism, as well as its improved version by introducing the ReliableFactor, as case study to examine the performance of anti-cheating scheme. The experimental results show that it performs quite well in various cheating cases.
It is interesting and necessary to investigate the cheating behaviors and verify the effectiveness of our proposed anti-cheating mechanism in more gossip-based decentralized protocols as future work.
